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The Lawyer's Role When
the Defendant Seeks Death
Ross E. Eisenberg*
"A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent repre-
sentation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation."1
"A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition,
obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and may take whatever
lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or
endeavor."2
"In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide bythe client's decision, after consulta-
tion with the lawyer, as to the plea to be entered, whether to waive jurytrial and
whether the client will testify."3
I.L In tid
The above excerpts from the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct are
distilled by the American Bar Association's instruction that "[tihe duties of a
lawyer to be a competent, diligent, and zealous advocate for the interests of her
clients also suggest that she must take reasonable steps to avoid engaging in
conduct adverse to her own client's interests."4 These rules come into sharp
conflict when a competent capital defendant enters a guiltyplea and asks the trial
court for a death sentence. On the one hand, a lawyer is required to provide
competent zealous advocacy, on the other, he must act merelyas a representative
and abide by the client's decision. This dilemma for defense attorneys is not
unknown in Virginia; several defendants have been convicted and executed in the
* JD. Candidate, May 2002, Washington & Lee University School of Law- BA, Emory
University. Special Thanks to Anna for her unwavering support, and to my family, my friends,
Professor Roger D. Groot and all the members of the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse.
1. VA.RULESOFPROF'L C -NDUCrR- 1.1 (2001).
2. VA.RULEsOFPROF'LOLDCrR. 1.3 cmt 1(2001).
3. VA. RULES OF PROF'L GMLXJcr R. 12(a) (2001).
4. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 98-411 (1998).
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past five years under circumstances in which the defendant pleaded guilty to
capital murder and asked to be sentenced to death.'
This article examines the ethical and professional obligations of the attorney
whose client pleads guilty and asks for death. It surveys each step of the process
by which a defendant can follow this course - competency evaluation, the guilty
plea, sentencing (byrefusingto present mitigating evidence or bytaking the stand
and literally "asking for death"), and waiver of appeal to the Supreme Court of
Virginia. This article looks to developments in other states for guidance and
studies the facts surrounding several competent Virginia defendants who have
pleaded guilty and asked for death in recent years. Finally, this article suggests
tactics for the lawyer to employ when faced with a defendant who elects execu-
tion.
. Vk*a's Rz qc'Etiia
On January 1, 2000, the Commonwealth of Virginia replaced its seventeen-
year-old Code of Professional Responsibility("Code") with the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct ("Rules").6 The newRules followthe same format as the current
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("ABA Model
Rules")! The new Rules are more streamlined than the prior Code and, because
of their relative youth, have not yet generated a body of law in Virginia! As a
result, many of the ethics opinions and state court cases still in force rely upon
5. Thomas Wayne Akers pleaded guilty to capital murder for his role in the beating death
of Wesley Brant Smith, and was sentenced to death; he sought the death penaly from the moment
he was apprehended. Virginians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty, 7hw Akes, at
hp-J/www.vadp.org/cases/akersuirm (last visited August 29, 2001). Akers is believed to have
asled for the death penalty because he preferred death to serving life without parole at Virginia's
super-maximum security prisons. Id Akers was executed on March 1, 2001. Virginians for
Akeraivesto the Death Penalty, ViiaExxdrn1amzi at http'J/www.vadp.org/exinfohtm
(last visited November 13,2001). David Leston Overton pleaded guiltyto capitalmurder and asked
for death in 1999. Virginians for Alternatives to the Death Peaky, Daid Owzvw, at
http'J/www.vadp.org/cases/overton.htm (last visited November 13, 2001). Overton committed
suicide while on death row. Virginians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty, Dazib RowPnkor
FcdDzdinhis Cd, (Spring 2001),ahttp'J/www.vadp.org/nlhm. DanielLee Zirlde and James
Earl Patterson, currently on Virginia's death row awaiting execution, also pleaded guilty and asked
their respective trial courts for death sentences. SeaVirginians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty,
7he Mm on Vinias Dath Roul at http.J/www.vadp.org/ meurowhtm (last visited November 13,
2001); Virginas for Alternatives to the Death Penalty, Va. Deab Peunzy New & Upw, a
http.J/www.vadp.org/cases/zirldehtm (last visited November 13,2001); Virginians for Alterna-
tives to the Death Penalty, Va. Death Penalty Neus & Updates, at
http'J/www.vadp.org/patterson.htm (last visited November 13,2001).
6. VA. GODE OF PROF'L RESPOMIrnuTY Editor's Note (2000).
7. SwVA. RULES OF PROF'L GNDUCrPreamble (2001).
8. Furthermore, the Preamble to the Rules of Professional Conduct mention that other
states' interpretations of the ABA Model Rules are to be regarded merelyas suggestions in Virginia.
Se VA. RULES OF PROFL GD.UCr Preamble (2001).
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the Code.' The Rules have incorporated a cross reference table linking sections
of the prior Code to corresponding sections in the new Rules.
Ill. 71z Prs
In considering the competent defendant who pleads guilty and asks for
death, it is helpful to consider each phase of the judicial process at which the
defendant can achieve part of his goal. The first phase is the competency
evaluation.10 The second phase is the guilty plea." Third is the process of
"asking for death," which can be done both by refusing to present evidence in
mitigation at sentencing or bythe defendant taking the stand and literally asking
the court to execute him. 2 The last phase is the defendant's waiver of an appeal
to the Supreme Court of Virginia for sentence review."
A. 7Tv La er's RdeinDi rsu~ Meta Ccwpev
The notion of competence is fundamental to all the attorney's and defen-
dant's successive decisions in this discussion; without a competent defendant, the
lawyer takes on a larger role and mayeven be required to serve as the defendant's
de facto guardian.' More importantly, a declaration of incompetence will
prevent the defendant from being able to plead guilty and ask for death." The
trial court's consideration of a capital defendant's competency is critical to
enforcing the defendant's right to make fundamental decisions regarding the
disposition of his case.16
9. Sa eg, Va. Legal Ethics Opinion No. 1737 (1999).
10. VA. CODE ANN. 519.2-169.1(E) (ichie 2000) (setting forth the procedure for raising
and determining competency to stand tria).
11. VA. COMT. art. 1, S 8 (providing that an accused has the right to plead guiltyin a criminal
n.ia.
12. SwUS. COMT. amend. VI (grating the criminal defendant the right to call witnesses in
his favor); US. COiMT. amend. XIV (guaranteeing the right to be heard and to offer testimon).
13. VA. CODE ANN. S17.1-313 (Mlichie 1999) (outlining the procedure for mandatosyreview
of a death sentence); seeAkers v. Com nwealh, 535 S.E.2d 674 (Va. 2000) (affirming defendant's
death sentence in lieu of defendant's waiver of appeal and attempted waiver of appeal of right).
14. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCrR. 1.14 cmt. 2 (2001) ("The fact that a client suffers a
disability does not diminh the lawyer's obligation to treat the client with attention and respect. If
the person has no guardian or legal representative, the awyer must act as ade facto guardian."); VA.
CODE OF PROFL RESPOIBITY EC 7-12 (2000) ("Any mental or phyical condition of a client
that renders him i )able of malting a considered judgment on his own behalf casts additional
responsibilities upon hs er).
15. VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-1692 (Mlichie 2000) ("Disposition when defendant found
incompetent"); VA. ODED ANN. S 19.2-169 (Michie 2000) ("Disposition of the unrestorably
incompetent defendant") (effective July 1, 2003).
16. Id
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In Virginia, the trial judge has an obligation to notice a defendant's compe-
tency (or lack thereof), 7 but the issue of a defendant's competency may be
brought to the judge's attention by representations of counsel for either the
defendant or the Commonwealth." The competency evaluators complete a
competency report following an examination of the defendant," and the trial
court must promptlydecide whether the defendant is indeed competent to stand
trial20 The defense of incompetency may not be waived by the incompetent
defendant, and his counsel likewise cannot waive it for him byfailing to move for
examination of the defendant's competency."
Arguably a person who elects to press for his own death is, regardless of
all other signs, mentally unsound.? There has been some literature suggesting
that defendants who elect execution are indeed suffering from a psychological
disorder.23 The Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct require that, when a
client's ability to make adequately considered decisions in connection with his
representation is inpaired or when the lawyer believes the client cannot ade-
quately act in his own interest, the attorney may seek the appointment of a
guardian or take other actions to protect the client.24 Thus, if the attorney
reasonably believes the client's decision to seek death is not competently made,
17. Se Drope v. Missouri, 420 US. 162, 181 (1975) (stating that 'a trial court nmust always
be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused unable to meet the
standards of competence to stand trial").
18. VA. GODE ANN. S 192-169.1 (Michie 2000). Section 192-169.1(A) states, in pertinent
part:
If, at any time after the attorney for the defendant has been retained or appointed
and before the end of trial, the court finds, upon hearing evidence or representations
of counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the Commonwealth, that there is
probable cause to believe that the defendant cks substantial capacityto understand
the proceedings against him or to assist his attorney in his own defense, the court
shall order that a competency evaluation be performed.
Id
19. VA.CODE ANN. S 192-169.1(D) (Mlchie 2000) (requiring the evaluators, upon comple-
tion of the competency examination, to submit a competency report to the court).
20. VA. CODE ANN. S 192-169.1(E) (alchie 2000) (mandating that the court promptly
determine whether the defendant is competent to stand tria).
21. SeeKibert v. Peyton, 383 F2d 566(4th Gr. 1%7) (holding that the defense of incompe-
tencyto stand trial cannot be waived by the incompetent or the incompetent's attorney by failure
to move for a competency examination).
22. SeI-. BEDEAU,iEUR'IS,T-HEQO'1m ON,ANDCArrALPUNISHMENr123 .26
(1977).
23. Id (questioning the defendant's competencyin Gimmv Uta/. "Was not his death wish
itself pathological and to some extent the subtle product of social practices over which he had no
controv").
24. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CODuCr R. 1.14(b) (2001) (granting the attorney the authority
to seek the appointment of a guardian or take other protective action 'only when the lawyer
reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest").
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the attorney can use this belief as the basis to make the decision not to press for
a death sentence.
The United States Supreme Court, in Res v Peftr 2s highlighted the impor-
tance of exploring a capital murder defendant's competencywhen he presses for
death2 6 InRw, the defendant pursued his Virginia death sentence ultimatelyto
the United States Supreme Court on writ of habeas corpus. About one month
after the petition had been filed, however, the defendant directed his counsel to
withdraw the habeas corpus petition and discontinue any further legal proceed-
ings.27 The Court placed assessment of the defendant's competencyas the most
important consideration and suspended the withdrawal of the defendant's
petition so that he could be evaluated for competency." Counsel insisted on a
psyhiatric evaluation, and the psychiatrist concluded Rees was incompetent.29
As in Re, incompetency can serve as a roadblock to a defendant's wishes to
hasten execution. The client will be best served by an attorney who initiates a
competency assessment as soon as the client begins to discuss a guilty plea and
request the death penalty.SA client's competence was addressed in the former Code, which stated:
"any mental or physical condition of a client that renders him incapable of
making a considered judgment on his own behalf casts additional responsibilities
upon his lawyer.""0 Furthermore, "his lawyer may be compelled in court pro-
ceedings to make decisions on behalf of the client." 1 The Rules do not have a
competency rule that equates to the aforementioned Code section. 2 Theoreti-
cally, this means the attorney's ethical burden under the Rules is less if the
defendant is declared incompetent than if the Code were still in force. If this
were true, however, it would be in sharp contrast to the attorney's ongoing
obligation to assess competency inferred from Rees.
An argument can also be made comparing the defendant who asks the court
for the death penaltyto a person receiving state-assisted suicide or euthanasia."
25. 384 US. 312 (1966).
26. See Rees v. Peyton, 384 US. 312 (1%6) (holding that, when confronted with a capital
defendant who withdrew a petition for certiorari one month after it was filed, the Supreme Court
could not dispose of the petition until the district court determined whether the defendant had
capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational ch6ice or had been suffering from "mental




30. VA. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSI uY EC 7-12 (2000).
31. Id
32. VA. RULES OF PROF. u CONUCr Cross Reference Table: Virginia Rules of Professional
Conduct to Code of Professional Responibility (2000).
33. MCHAEL MILLO, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VERsL THEODORE JOHN
KACZYNSKI 191-92(1999). In comparing a defendant who asks for death to a person seeking state-
assisted suicide, the author further states:
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From this perspective, is the attorney who consents to his client's wishes aiding
the client in an unlawful activity? Since the death penalty is not per se unlawful,
it would be difficult to frame an argument around the notion that an attorney
who fails to present mitigation or foregoes an appeal of right at his client's
request is participating in unlawful behavior or aiding and abetting a crime. If the
death penalty is viewed in a particular instance (perhaps where there is serious
doubt the defendant is in fact guilty) as a form of state-assisted suicide, however,
counsel is prohibited by the Rules from taking part in such activity-
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Bede v
A ?Va;W , held that a defendant (or his attome) who wishes to challenge a trial
court's decision on competency grounds can attack it in two ways: procedural
competency and substantive competency.' A procedural competency claim
alleges that the trial court failed to hold a competency hearing once the defen-
dant's competency was put at issue.3 A substantive competency claim alleges
that the defendant was, in fact, tried and convicted while incompetent.38 The
major difference between procedural and substantive incompetency claims is
that, under a procedural competency claim the defendant is entitled to a pre-
sumption of incompetency, while under a substantive claim he is not. 9 Bek
strongly supports the attorney who argues that each stage of trial in which a
capital defendant seeks death - guilt/innocence, sentencing, and appeal - should
begin with a presumption of incompetency.
But since Gary Gilmore's consensual execution in 1977, the law has been fairly
settled that a condemned prisoner - and no one else in America - do have a right
to forego challenges to the legality of his execution, so long as such prisoner is
deemed by the courts to be mentally competent to make the decision and he has
done so vohuta. And, when he does, the state will provide him with all the
"assistance" he needs to die, including a custom-built machine and the technic;n
necessary to make it work In other words, a death row prisoner who is mentally
competent and fully informed of the rishs and consequences of his actions, has a
egal right to die. That right, I will suggest below, includes the right of attorney
assistance when necessary to enforce it.
Id
34. SeeVA. RULES OF PROF'L ONDUCRT. 12(c) (2001) ("A lawyer shall not counsel a client
to engage, or assist a dient, in conduct that the lwyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.").
35. 261 F3d 377 (4th Cr. 2001).
36. SeeBeckv. Angelone, 261 F.3d 377, 387 (4th Cr. 2001) (stating that competency claims
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment can raise issues of both procedural
and substantive due process).
37. Id
38. Id at 387-88.
39. Id at 388. Under a claim of substantive incompetency, the defendant must demonstrate
his incompetencybya preponderance of the evidence. Id (citing Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172,




The competence standard for guilty pleas was set out in Gadiv v Moran
in 1993. The United States Supreme Court held the standard of competency
for pleading guilty is the same as the competency standard for standing trial
"whether the defendant has 'sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding' and has 'a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against hin.' 4 2 Gi furthe held
that a competency finding is not the only requirement for a guiltyplea; the court
must also find that the waiver of constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary.3
Gai?= appears not to set a higher standard of competence for pleading guilty
than going to trial It is, however, important to note that the "knowing, volun-
tary and intelligent" prong of Gx&= is the same as that which is applied in other
guilty plea cases." The guilty plea necessarily involves waiver of the three great
trial rights - the privilege against self incrimination, trial by jury and confronta-
tion.45 In general, the standard for a waiver of these three rights requires a
deeper level of understanding than that expressed in the competence-to-stand-
trial standard.' The differential makes perfect sense. The competence-to-stand-
trial standard assumes the defendant will go to trial and therefore will receive,
with the assistance, guidance and advice of counsel, his three great trial rights.
Preciselybyhis plea, conversely, the pleading defendant is giving up those rights.
It necessarily follows that the waiver of rights should require a greater under-
standing of the meaning and effect of those rights than is required to accept the
enjoyment of them. Counsel should therefore be alert to competence at the first
level as well as the greater understanding necessaryat the second level to execute
a constitutionally valid waiver.
40. 509 US. 389 (1993).
41. Godinez v. Moran, 509 US. 389, 399 (1993) (stating that "we can conceive of no basis
for demanding a higher level of competence for those defendants who choose to plead guilty').
42. Id at 396 (quoting Duskyv. United States, 362 US. 402 (1960)).
43. Id at 400. A "knowing and voluntary" guilty plea is defined as "whether the plea
represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the
defendant" Parke v. RaIey, 506 US. 20,28-29 (1992).
44. Gcim, 509 US. at 400.
45. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 US. 238,243 (1969) (holding that a guiltyplea in a state criminal
trial involves three constitutional rights: the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination (citing Malloyv. Hogan, 378 US. 1, 3 (1964)); the right to tabyju(citing Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 US. 145, 149 (1968)); and the right to confront one's accusers (citing Pointer v.
Texas, 380 US. 400, 403 (1965))).
46. S, eg, Henderson v. Morgan, 426 US. 637 (1976) (explaining standards for determining
voluntariness of a guilty plea).
2001]
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Although they set only the minimal, non-aspirational standard for awtoty
competence, Stri&klaiv Waszhi 4 and Hi/l v Loake t? help make the point."'
The Sti&/anddeficiencyplus-prejudice standard is applied to guiltypleas byHil
as deficiency-plus-prejudice in the form of a "but-for" test: but for counsel's
deficiencies, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty.' When restated in
terms of the Gd&= waiver by a minimally competent defendant, the prejudice
question should be whether the defendant, but for counsel's deficiency (failure
to recognize that waiver requires more than minimal competence), wuldconstitu-
tionally have pleaded guilty.
According to the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, the decision to
plead guilty ultimately rests with the client."' Still, the lawyer should avoid
allowing a guilty plea by the capital murder defendant. The attorney's involve-
ment should go far beyond the bare minimum required by Styi&/ard as his duty
to the client is not simply to be competent enough to avoid an ineffective
assistance claim. Counsel has a continuing obligation to prepare for trial He
might also consider negotiations with the trial judge: explain to the judge that the
defendant currentlyinsists on pleading guilty, but that the attorney continues to
tryto convince him to go to trial Continuing trial preparation, therefore, would
be pointless and unnecessarily costly if the defendant pleads guilty. For all
indigent capital defendants, continuing trial preparation in this situation raises the
cost for both parties, who are financially, in fact, the Commonwealth. 2 The
attorney should ask the judge to allow him to stop preparing for a possible trial
while he continues to urge the defendant to proceed to trial. The attomeyshould
seek assurances that, if the defendant changes his mind and decides to go to trial,
the judge will grant a continuance so that the attorney can adequately prepare.
This strategy will help counsel fulfill his obligations, while not burdening the
system with potentially useless trial preparation.
C -AskvfrDeath"
A defendant can "ask for death" at sentencing in two ways: (1) he can
refuse to present mitigating evidence, or (2) he can take the stand and plead for
execution. Virginia's capital sentencing scheme does not require a defendant in
47. 466 US. 668 (1984).
48. 474 US. 52 (1985).
49. S& Strickland v. Washington, 466 US. 668 (1984) (setting forth the test for effective
assistance of counsel; Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (holding the Stik/vd standard for
evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claim applies to guilty plea challenges based on
ineffective assistance of counsel.
50. St&Wvi, 466 US. at 694; Hi, 474 US. at 59.
51. VA.RULESoFPROF'LCONDUrl 12(a) (2001).
52. Both parties are "financiallythe Commonwealh" because the Commonwealh bears the
cost of prosecuting the case and providing an adequate defense for indigent capital defendants.
[Vol. 14:1
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a capital murder trial to present evidence in mitigation.s3 Still, the presentation
of mitigating evidence is encouraged, because proportionality review by the
Supreme Court of Virginia is statutorilymandatedYs Proportionality review can
be fully effective only if the available mitigating evidence is in the record.
Virginia has addressed the problem of a capital murder defendant's refusal
to present mitigating evidence at sentencing in an ethics opinion issued by the
Virginia State Bar Ethics Counsel." The opinion addresses the hypothetical
situation in which the defendant has been found competent by a psychiatrist but
informs counsel he desires a death sentence rather than life in prison.s The
hypothetical assumes that counsel has investigated and found mitigating evidence
in the defendant's background.' Nevertheless, the defendant instructs the
attorney not to present evidence in mitigation on his behalf." The issue was
whether counsel would violate the Code by presenting mitigating evidence
despite his client's instruction not to do so." The opinion recognized the
conflict in the Code between the attorney's obligation "diligently and compe-
tently" to represent the client by making the best possible case for merc" and
the attorney's responsibility to achieve the client's lawful objectives and follow
the client's directions.61
The underlying problemin the opinion is "whether the lawyer should follow
the lawful demands of the client when those demands may cause prejudice or
damage to the client's case."62 The opinion concludes that "the attorney is
ethically bound to carry out the client's directive, even though such instruction
is tantamount to a death wish."6" Furthermore, the opinion concludes that the
defendant cannot thereafter succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel
53. Se Commonwealth v. Tie, Case Nos. 98-2980-00 and 98-2980-01 (Tr. at 1045) (Va. CJr.
CL Feb. 14, 2000) (unreported decision) (COrcuit Court for the City of Norfoll). In T4 the trial
judge gave the jury a "death is not mandatory" instruction; therefore, even if the defendant fails to
present mitigating evidence, the jury is nonetheless not required to give a death sentence. Ud
54. SwVA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(Q(1)-(2) (Mlchie 1999) (mandating that a sentence of
death, upon final judgment in the circuit court, must be reviewed on the record by the Supreme
Court, which must determine: (1) "whether the sentence of death was imposed under the iM e
of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor"; and (2) "whether the sentence of death is
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime
and the defendant").





60. 1d; see VA. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONImILIT DR 6-101(A), EC 7-1 (2000).
61. SVA. CODE OF POF'L RESPOIBIpITY DR 7.101(A) (2000).




claim.6' There are caveats, however for the attorney to be protected from an
ineffective assistance claim, he must counsel the client regarding the risks and
benefits of presenting mitigating evidence before he abides by the defendant's
decision, and he must determine that the defendant's choice to seek a death
sentence was "rational and stable."" He must also prepare evidence in mitigation
in the hopes the defendant chooses to present it.
D. Waiter jfAppead to d Sspwr COa f V' a
When a capital murder defendant in Virginia is sentenced to death, direct
review of the sentence bythe Supreme Court of Virginia is mandatory." "Auto-
matic appeal" statutes such as the one in Virginia have been approved by the
United States Supreme Court as an adequate safeguard against arbitrary and
indiscriminate enforcement of the death penaty.6  Regardless, capital murder
defendants in Virginia have at times directed counsel not to brief or argue the
case on appeal or have attempted to waive their rights to appeal altogether.
When faced with this situation, the Supreme Court of Virginia conducts its
mandatory review despite the defendant's wishes.'9 This poses an interesting
dilemma for the practitioner. Should he obey his client's wishes to waive all
issues for appeal? Or, because the Supreme Court will in fact conduct its
statutorily-mandated review, will the attorneyessentiallybe rendering ineffective
assistance bynot briefing the issues that will be reviewed. Should the attorney
decide not to brief and argue these issues on appeal? If the defendant changes
his mind and asserts the attorney did not adequately protect his interests, the
attorney will no doubt find himself in court arguing that he passed the Strikand
test.
The issue of waiver of an appeal of right was discussed in the well-publi-
cized case of Gilnm v UtaAI° before the United States Supreme Court in 1976.2"
64. Id
65. Id
66. SwVA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(C)(1)-(2) (ichie 1999) (mandating that a sentence of
death, upon final judgment in the circuit court, must be reviewed on the record by the SEte
Court, which must determine (1) "whether the sentence of death was imposed under thei nce
of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor," and (2) "whether the sentence of death is
excessive or disPo ruonte to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime
and the dfe n).
67. SwGregg v. Georgia, 428 US. 153,206(1976) (holding that Georgia's automatic appeal
statute, whichin a opotionalityreviewelement, "substantallyeliminates the possibilirythat
a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury").
68. Swe#mzdy Akers v. Gommonweakh, 535 S.E2d 674 (Va. 2000); Zirde v. Common-
walth,551 SE.2d 601 (Va. 2001). In both cases, the defendant waived his appeal of right, but the
Supreme Court of Vuginia nonetheless conducted its mandatory review.
69. See gmay Akers v. Commonwealth, 535 SX.2d 674 (Va. 2000); Zirlde v. Common-
wea 551 S.E2d 601 (Va. 2001).
70. 429 US. 1012 (1976).
71. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) (holding that Gilmore, who had been
[Vol. 14:1
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The Court held that the defendant, Gary Mark Gilmore, made a knowing and
intelligent waiver of the right to an appeal of his death sentence to the Supreme
Court of Urah.n The Virginia standard is similar to that of C4mw but not
identical In Virginia the capital defendant maynot waive propormionalityreview
or passion and prejudice inquiry by the Supreme Court; waiver of appellate
issues, however, is acceptable provided the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent." Several oter states have held, to varying degrees, that a capital
murder defendant may not waive a statutorily mandated a ppeaL In People v
Stanuab, 4 for instance, the California Supreme Court refused to allow the
defendant to waive his automatic appeal of a death sentence given bya California
trial court. 5
The North Carolina State Bar issued a proposed opinion in 1996 concerning
representation of a client on death row who wished to forego an appeal of right
and hasten execution.76 As in Virginia, a defendant convicted of capital murder
and sentenced to death in North Carolina receives an automatic appeal of his
sentence to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.' The opinion dealt with a
hypothetical defendant who asks his attorney to withdraw from representation
in the automatic appeal to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, and does not
want his case briefed or argued. 7 The opinion instructs the attorneyto exercise
his professional judgment in assessing the situation and to consider the legal
requirement of an automatic appeal of a death penaltycase, the client's expressed
desire as well as his mental and emotional state, and the need for a mental
evaluation of the client." Although there are no comparable written guidelines
in Virginia, the process described is very similar to the methods applied by
Virginia courts in assessing a capital murder defendant's waiver of a statutorily
mandated appeal.
convicted and sentenced to death, made a knowing and voluntary waiver of any and all federal
rights which he might have asserted after the sentence was imposed).
72. Id at 1013.
73. Pattersonv. Commonweakh, 551 S.E.2d 332,335 (Va. 2001) (holding that the defendant
could permissiblymake a "knowing, volutary, and intelligent" waiver of non-statutorilymandated
appellate issues).
74. 457 P.2d 889 (Cal 1969).
75. SeePeople v. Stanworth, 457 P.2d 889, 898 (Cal. 1969) ("It is manifest that the state in
is solicitude for a defendant under sentence of death has not only invoked on his behalf a right to
review the conviction bymeans of an automatic appeal but has also imposed a dutyupon this court
to make such review. We cannot avoid or abdicate this duty merely because defendant desires to
waive the fight provided for him.").
76. N.C State Bar, Ethics Op. RPC 233 (1996).
77. N.C GEN. STAT. S 15A-2000(d)(1) (1999) (guaranteeing automatic review of a death
sentence bythe Supreme Court of North Carolina pursuant to procedures established bythe Rules
of Appellate Procedure).




IV. 7eAuwaoesEdincaC ii inStazs Oasde Vvgia
The Supreme Court of Tennessee has examined the topic in a series of
Ethics Opinions and cases. In 1984, counsel for Edmund George Zagorski
contacted the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of
Tennessee for guidance in a capital nmrder case in which he was representing a
defendant who instructed him not to present evidence in nitigation. ° The
Board issued a Formal Ethics Opinion considering the ethical obligations of
court-appointed counsel in a capital case when the defendant instructs his
attorney not to present evidence in mitigation.81 In its Opinion, the Board
recommended that counsel fullyinform the accused of his constitutional right to
conduct a defense of his choice, but also advise the defendant that his rights and
interests are in conflict with counsel's moral beliefs and ethical responsibilities. 2
If the defendant continues to insist that evidence in mitigation will not be
presented, counsel should advise the defendant that a motion to withdraw from
those portions of the trial will be filed with the court. 3 The Board advised that
the attorney should fully inform the court regarding the conflicts between the
defendant and himself.84 The attorney should then seek an adjudication that the
defendant is competent to represent himself during the voir dire examination of
prospective jurors and the penalty stages of the trial or any other portion of the
trial where the conflict is imminent."5 Finally, counsel should move the trial court
to withdraw from representation during the portion of the trial where the conflict
is apparent, and in the event this motion is denied should seek immediate review
by the appellate court.
8 6
After the Board issued the 1984 Ethics Opinion, counsel abided by
Zagorski's decision not to present mitigating evidence. Despite the Ethics
Opinion's instructions, however, counsel refused to withdraw from anyportion
of the proceedings."' Zagorski was convicted and sentenced to death, and the
Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed his sentence on appeal.8 Defendant then
sought state habeas relief. In that case, Zagrki v State, the defendant brought
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim against his attorney who, by following
the express instruction of a "competent and fully informed" Zagorski, did not
investigate or present mitigating evidence at the settencing phase of trial. 9 The
80. Se State v. Zagorski, 701 S.W.2d 808 (Tenn. 1985) (affirming defendant's two death
sentences).





86. Tenn. Bd. of Profl Responslbility, Formal Op. 84-F-73 (1984).
87. Zagorshi v. State, 983 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tenn. 1998).
88. State v. Zagorski, 701 S.W.2d 808 (Tenn. 1985).
89. Zagorshi v. State, 983 S.W2d 654, 655 (renn. 1998).
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court, taking into account its 1984 Ethics Opinion, held that, under the circum-
stances of this case, counsel had no obligation to seek to terminate representa-
tion; moreover, the court held that counsel in the matter acted reasonably and
competently's The court held that in prospective cases, when a defendant
instructs counsel to forego mitigation, "counsel must inform the trial court of
[the] circumstances on the record and outside the presence of the jury.""' The
trial court must then take three steps to preserve the defendant's interests and a
complete record: (1) inform the defendant of his right to present mitigating
evidence; (2) inquire of defendant and counsel whether they have discussed the
importance of mitigating evidence and its potential to offset evidence in aggrava-
tion; and (3) "after being assured the defendant understands the importance of
mitigation, inquire of the defendant whether he or she desires to forego the
presentation of mitigating evidence."'
Three months later, the Board reexamined its 1984 Ethics Opinion in light
of the Supreme Court of Tennessee's holding in Zagoski and issued an amended
Formal Ethics Opinion.93 The amended Opinion explains that counsel, faced
with a situation like that in Zagisk4 is (1) not required to withdraw from further
representation of the defendant, absent the violation of another Disciplinary
Rule;,- (2) must otherwise followthe instructions of the 1984 Ethics Opinion; (3)
must seek a competency determination for the defendant as to whether he can
make such a decision to forego the presentation of mitigating evidence; (4) must
follow the instructions set forth in Zagoski; and (5) must not make known to the
court or prosecution the content of any available mitigating evidence.95
The Zagonki case and related Ethics Opinions are extremely important in
considering similar situations in Virginia. Virginia has issued an Ethics Opinion
relating to the same topic, but has not yet been confronted with an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim based on counsel agreeing to withhold mitigating
evidence.' Zagmki considers the ineffective assistance claim in both legal
7 and
ethical contexts. 3 Counsel in Virginia cases would be best served to create a trial
record, as instructed by Zagnk, in order to insulate itself from a potential
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The attorney further has an obligation to
90. Id at 660.
91. Id
92. Id
93. Tenn. Bd. of Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 84-F-73(a) (1999).
94. "DisciplinaryRule" refers to the DisciplinaryRules of Tennessee's Code of Professional
Responsibility, which virtually mirrors Virginia's replaced Code of Professional Responsibility.
95. Tenn. Bd. of Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 84-F-73(a) (1999).
96. Va. Legal Ethics Opinion No. 1737 (1999).
97. Zagorskiv. State, 983 S.W.2d 654,657-59 (Tenn. 1998);SeStrickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984).




continue investigating the case and preparing for trial, sentencing, and appeal.
The Zagski framework requires counsel to seek a competencydetermination for
the defendant; this is similar to Virinia, which recognizes a continuing tripartite
obligation to notice competency.' Counsel should consider citing Zaorki in
situations in Virginia in which the defendant wishes to forego mitigation, and
note the similarity between the 1999 Tennessee Ethics Opinion and the current
Ethics Opinion in Virginia addressing the same topic. Counsel in Virginia can
argue the five Zagoki requirements for prevention of an ineffective assistance
claim in order to combat a similar assertion.
1°°
Most states outside Virginia that have dealt with the problem of the defen-
dant's refusal to present mitigation are in accord with the Virginia Ethics Opin-
ion. 01 California, however, has subjected itself to serious discussion regarding
the lawyer's responsibility to present evidence in mitigation despite his client's
wishes. In Pegple v Dawl °) the Supreme Court of California held, when the
defendant barred his attorney frompresenting mitigating evidence at the penalty
phase in a capital case and instead gave a simple statement that he wished to die
for his crimes, there was ineffective assistance of counsel on the part of the
attorney.10 3 Dee was disapproved, but not overruled, four years later in People
v Blxo n4" in which the Supreme Court of California held that the failure to
introduce mitigating evidence did not per se render the death sentence
unreliable.05 The court in Bl0mcriticized any requirement that defense counsel
present mitigating evidence over a client's objections.' 16
It is interesting to note that the court in Dwe held counsel to be ineffective
when, in addition to withholding mitigating evidence, the defendant took the
stand and told the court he wished to die for his crimes.'07 This is the other way
99. See Drope v. Issouri, 420 US. 162, 181 (1975) (finding that "a trial court must always
be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused unable to meet the
standards of competence to stand trial).
100. See Tenn. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 84-F-73(a) (1999).
101. SeesmndiyTenn. Bd. of Prof Responsibility, Formal Op. 84-F-73(a) (1999) (finding that
the attorney must uhimately abide by the defendant's wish to forego presentation of mitigating
evidence, assuming he passes a competency examination); N.C State Bar, Ethics Op. RPC 233
(1996) (holding that the attorney should take into account the defendant's mental and emotional
state, and use professional judgment in abiding by the defendant's wishes).
102. 710 P.2d 925 (Cal. 1985).
103. SeePeople v. Deere, 710 P2d 925,931 (Cal. 1985) ('[T"he defense attorney's honest but
mistaken belief that he had 'no right whatsoever to infringe upon his [client's] decisions about his
own life' operated to deny defendant his right to the effective assistance of counsel.").
104. 774 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989).
105. SeePeople v. Bloom, 774 P2d 698, 717-18 (Cal. 1989) (holding that a pro se defendant
could not claim ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to present his own mitigating
evidence).
106. Id at 717-19
107. Dav 710 P2d at 929. In Dem "counsel first permitted his client to make a brief
statement to the court acknowledging that 'I know what I done was wrong' and 'I always believed
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to "ask for death," and it is achieved by the defendant literally taking the stand
and pleading with the court to kill him.' °s The issue of taking the stand and
pleading for a death sentence has occurred, but has not yet been judicially or
administratively analyzed in Virginia. The capital murder defendant has a right
to testify in his own behalf, even if testifying operates as an invitation to the
court for execution.'' In addition, the Rules do not articulate an ethical bar to
counsel allowing the defendant to take the stand and ask for death. The Rules
expressly place the decision whether or not the client will testifyin the hands of
the client! 10
V. ViOa Case SudB
The following case studies are intended to illustrate the positions of defen-
dants and attorneys in Virginia over the past few years who have been faced with
situations similar to those outlined in this article.
A. 7blxm Wam Aken
Thomas Wayne Akers was charged with capial murder during the commis-
sion of a robbery for the beating death of 24-year-old Wesley Brant Smith."'
Akers and a co-defendant, Tmothy Dwayne Martin, killed Smith, took Smith's
car, and fled toward Canada." 2 Akers and Martin were apprehended in upstate
New York." Akers was said to have sought the death penalty from the moment
he was apprehended." 4 Akers would not talk with his attorneys for two months
and, while in pretrial detention, described the murder in detail to fellow jail
inmates s.' When questioned about the murder after his arrest, he attempted to
[in] an eye for an eye. I feel I should die for the crimes I done." Id
108. Thomas Wayne Akers, for instance, told the sentencing court he would commit future
crimes if it spared his life. The court sentenced him to death. Akers v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d
674, 676 (2000).
109. SeUS. CONST. amend. VI (granting the criminal defendant the to call witnesses in
his favor); U.S. CorS. amend. XIV (guaranteeing right to be heard and to offer testimony as a due
process right).
110. VA. RULES OF PROF't OGNDUCr R. 1.2(a) (2001) ([Iua a criminal case, the lawyer shall
abide bythe client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether
to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.").
111. SeAlers v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 674 (2000) (affirming defendant's sentence of
death; Virgnians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty, Thomr Akes, at
http:/www.vadp.org/cases/akershtm (last visited August 29, 2001) (explaining the story of
Thomas Wayne Alers).
112. Virginians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty, 7hbm Akes, at
httpi/www.vadp.org/cases/akersiitm (last visited August 29,2001).
113. Id
114. Id
115. Id Presumably, Akers spoke to fellow inmates about the murder in the hope that
someone would "snitch and the testimonywould be used against him at trial in pursuit of a death
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flee from the police station, and when he was subdued he told the police officers,
"It's a good day to die."" 6 Akers subsequently began sending letters to the
Commonwealth's Attorney admitting and describing details of the murder."'
Akers entered a plea of guilty to the charge of capital murder during the
commission of a robbery.'" He instructed his attorneys not to present any
evidence on his behalf when entering a guilty plea or at sentencing.' 9 Prior to
entry of the plea, Akers was evaluated by a licensed clinical psychologist and
found to be competent to enter that plea.2° At sentencing, Akers directed his
attorneys not to present anyevidence in mitigation, despite the Commonwealth's
overwhelming evidence in aggravation.'' He then asked the trial court for
death.' He claimed he would plot and come back to Franklin County to
commit additional murders if not executed; when asked if he wished to speak
prior to sentencing, he stated, "I have no sympathy for what I did, and I plan to
commit another capital murder in the future."" The trial court sentenced him
to death, and Akers subsequently waived his right to appeal and unsuccessfully
attempted to waive statutory proportionality review by the Supreme Court of
Virgini.12
4
Akers followed every step identified in this article - entered a guilty plea,
refused to present mitigating evidence, took the stand and asked for death, and
waived his appeal of right - and did so in an open and obnoxious fashion.s2 The
fact that he knew exactly what to say at sentencing (regarding future dangerous-
ness) to ensure a death sentence indicates his actions were voluntary and intelli-
gent. 26 Counsel abided by Aers's instructions everystep of the way, and neither
the trial court nor the Supreme Court of Virginia identified error in the attorney's
handling of the case. Perhaps the only way to attack this disturbing chain of
sentence.
116. Akes, 535 S.E.2d at 675.
117. Id
118. Id; seeVA. GDE ANN. S 181-31(4) (Mchie Supp. 2001) (qualifying as capital muaer
ht]be willful, deliberate, and premeditated hilling of any person in the commission of robbery or
attempted robberyl).
119. Akis, 535 S.E2d at 676.
120. Id The psychologist specifically stated, "Akers possessed the capacity to rationally
understand, appreciate, and consider the consequences of his plea of guilty." He also stated that
while [i]t makes all parties uncomfortable to see a defendant choose to place himself in the [worst]





124. Id at 674.
125. Id at 674-76.
126. Sees"ra note 123 and accompany text (stating that "I have no sympathy for what I
did, and I plan to commit another cap=al muder in the fiure-).
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events would have been to press for further competency evaluation, with the
possible outcome being that a conflicting opinion would surface and delay the
process in a waysimilar to that in Rw.' The attorneycould use this delayto try
to convince Akers not to press for the death penalty.
B. JaMEaPantecn
James Earl Patterson was convicted of capital murder in the commission of
rape for the 1987 rape and murder of Joyce Sneed Aldridge.' Patterson's
situation is what is commonly known as a "cold-hit" DNA match. 9 He was
serving a twenty-five year sentence for another crime at the time of the capital
murder charge. 3' The suspected killer's DNA was compared with DNA in the
state-maintained database and was determined to be identical to Patterson's
DNA
13
Patterson confessed to the rape, murder, and abduction, and pleaded guilty
to all charges, against the recommendation of his attorney.'32 Patterson then
requested that no evidence in mitigation be presented at sentencing and asked the
court for death.' H attomeytrieddesperatelyto convince him otherwise, even
appealing to Patterson's deeply held religious beliefs, but ultimately failed."3' At
sentencing, Patterson told the judge, "I pray today that it will be some type of
closure for these families." 1' He also stated that if he received a life sentence he
"could not promise 'sometime that I may not spark out and ruin more lives. '" 36
Patterson waived any appeals and attempted to waive proportionality review by
the Supreme Court of Virginia. 37 The Court ordered a hearing to determine the
defendant's competencyto waive an appeal, and the trial court entered an order
finding Patterson "knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to
127. See Rees v. Peyton, 384 US. 312 (1966); seesu Part IMl.A.
128. Pattersonv. Commonwealh, 551 S.E2d 332,333 (2001) (affirmingPatterson's sentence
of death). Patterson also pleaded guilty to rape and abduction with intent to defile, entered an
"A #&dplea" to a charge of forcible sodomy, and was given two consecutive life sentences for the
abduction and sodomyconvictions. Id at 333 n.1; seeNorth Carolina v. Alfod, 400 US. 25 (1970).





134. Virginians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty, Vz Daub Peadty New & Updoes, at
http://www.vadp.org/cases/patterson.htm (last visited August 29, 2001) (outlining the story of
James Earl Patterson).
135. Id
136. Pavmacn, 551 S.E.2d at 335.
137. Id
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appeal.""' The Court affirmed his death sentence on appeal.'39 Patterson
currently sits on death row awaiting execution.'"
C DanidLeeZirkle
Daniel Lee Ziride was charged with the capital murder of Christina Mane
Zirkle, pursuant to Virginia Code Section 18.2-31(12)."" He entered a plea of
guilty.42 Before accepting Zirkle's guiltyplea, the trial court considered a proffer
of the evidence - despite Zirkle's concurrence - that the Commonwealth would
have presented during the trial's guilt phase.' The trial court also conducted an
inquiry into Zirlde's mental competency and found he was fully competent to
enter a plea of guilty.'" Prior to sentencing, he asked his attorneys not to present
evidence in mitigation; they obliged and Zirkie was sentenced to death.'" He
then directed his attorneys not to appeal the trial court's judgment.' The
Supreme Court directed Zirkle's attorneys to file a brief and present oral argu-
ment regarding the mandatoryissues required bystatute. 47 The Supreme Court
of Virginia then conducted a mandatory review despite Zirke's waiver and
affirmed his death sentence. 48 Zirkle is currentlysitting on Virginia's death row
awaiting execution." 9 Again, disproving the defendant's mental competency
might have been more successful had it been pressed further, as counsel did in
Res.1s0
138. Id
139. Id at 336.
140. Vingnians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty, 77z Men cn Viias Deaab Rozq at
http'J/www.vadp.org/menrow~atm Ost visited August 29, 2001) (documenn the men cunetly
sitting on Virginia's Death R"wj.
141. Zirkle v. Commonwealth, 551 S.E.2d 601 (2001); see VA. CODE ANN. 5 18.2-31(12)
(Mclie Supp. 2001) (qualifying as capital murder the 'willful, deliberate and premeditated killing




145. Id at 602.
146. Id
147. Id
148. Id; see VA. (CbE ANN. S17.1-313 Mlfchie 1999); see spm note 66.
149. Virginians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty, 77z Men en Vgns Degb Rorq at
http-J/www.vadp.org/menrow.htm (last visited August 29,2001) (documenting the men currently
siting on Virginia's Death Row). *
150. SeeRees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966).
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D. DazidLestan Omwr Jr.
David Leston Overton, Jr. pleaded guikyto capital murder in 1999.' After
hearing Overton's guihyplea and convicting him of capital murder, the trial court
heard evidence in aggravation and mitigation."i 2 After all the evidence in mitiga-
tion was presented, Overton submitted a letter to the trial court in which he
stated, "I do not wish to fight this. I humbly request that you respect [the vic-
tim's family's] wishes in sentencing me to death."' 3 The trial court then sen-
tenced him to death." Sometime following trial, however, Overton changed his
mind: he wanted to live.' He did not waive his appeal to the Supreme Court
of Virginia. Nevertheless, Overton failed to assign any errors on appeal except
with respect to the two questions mandated by Virginia Code Section 17.1-
313(Q: whether his sentence had been imposed as a result of passion or preju-
dice, and a proportionality review.'- In his appeal he asked the Supreme Court
of Virginia to commute17 his sentence of death to life imprisonment. 5 8 The
court denied this request, and affirmed Overton's death sentence." 9
151. Overton v. Commonwealth, 539 S.E2d 421,422 (Va. 2000) (affirming the defendant's
sentence of death).
152. 'Id at 423.
153. Id
154. Id at 422.
155. Id at 421. This is merelyan assumption, because he inexplicablyasked for commutation
of his sentence despite not raising any issues on appeal.
156. Id at 421-22. Why Overton did not appeal based on other incidences of error is not
dear, especiallysince he did in fact introduce mitigating evidence. Perhaps in examining the record
for appeal it was conceded that no issues were in fact preserved. Se VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-
313(Q(1)- (2) (Michie 1999) rmandati that a sentence of death, upon final judgment in the circuit
court, must be reviewed on the record bythe Supreme Court, which must determine (1) "whether
the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary
factor," and (2) "whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant").
157. Overton did indeed ask the Supreme Court of Virginia to commute his sentence, and in
its opinion the Court specifically declined to commute Overtons death sentence. Owr 539
S.E.2d at 422. The Court could not possibly have intended to commte the sentence, for it is not
allowed to bylaw. 'Commutation," as defined byBlack's Law Dictionary, means '[tlhe executive's
substitution in a particular case of a less severe punishment for a more severe one that has already
been judicially imposed on the defendant" BLAQ'S LAW DICnONARY 274 (7th ed. 1999).
Commutation in the death penaltycontext is an act of mercy; the proportionalityreview and passion
and prejudice review conducted bythe Supreme Court of Virginia is about justice, not mercy For
instance, if the Supreme Court conducts its roportionality review of a death sentence and finds
that death was not appropriate in the case undr review, it will overturn - not commute - the death
sentence. Overturning a defendant's death sentence on appeal is an act of justice, as it corrects the
wrong done to the defendant at the trial level- commuting that sentence to life imprisonment is an
act of mercy and is a function of the Executive Branch, not of the Supreme Court.
158. Oan* 539 S.E.2d at 421.
159. Id at 421-22.
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VI Strat fbrt eLaa
What is a lawyer to do when faced with a Thomas Akers, a James Earl
Patterson, or a Daniel Lee Zirkle, who insist on the lawyer's minimal role, plead
guilty, and ask the court for death? Furthermore, what is a lawyer to do when
faced with a David Leston Overton, who pleads guilybut changes his mind after
sentencing and appeals to the Supreme Court of Virginia, wanting to live?
The first strategy, of course, is to try to convince the defendant to change
his mind. In 1987, Professor Welsh S. White wrote an article regarding defen-
dants who elect execution and, in the course of his research, interviewed many
attorneys who had represented defendants in these situations.' 60 He found that
most attorneys, when questioned about the ethical and legal conflict posed by a
defendant who chooses death, did not consider it a major issue because theywere
convinced they could change the defendant's mind.161 Tactics are largely
defendant-specific, but can include appeals to family and friends, or perhaps to
the defendant's religious beliefs. For instance, if the defendant believes "Thou
shalt not kill," the attorney could try to convince him that the death penalty is
state-assisted suicide and his death would be a sin in violation of the Sixth
Commandment.16
The attorney should operate, from start to finish, on the assumption that
the defendant will in fact change his mind. Assuming the defendant does not
change his mind, however, the attorney should attempt throughout trial and.
sentencing simutaneouslyto protect the defendant's interests as well as his own.
To protect adequately his own interests, the attorney should take all necessary
steps to safeguard against an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 63 To
protect against this claim requires raising the competency issue if not already
raised, and meeting the Gaiiw standard for a guilty plea.1" It is extremely
important to remember, however, that the standard a lawyer must meet in order
to avoid an ineffective assistance claim does not prescribe what a lawyer ought
to do. The level of basic competence, therefore, does not state the attorney's
duty to the capital defendant who wishes to plead guilty and ask for death.
Protecting the capital defendant's rights and legal interests in the situation
in which he chooses to plead guilty and ask for death will be tricky. Neverthe-
less, the attorney can protect several of the defendant's interests while still
abiding byhis client's wishes. When a defendant pleads guiltyand instructs his
160. Welsh S. White, LD idvi Wb'oElarExeam, 48 U. PrIT. L.REV. 853,855 a.15 (1987).
161. Id at 857.
162. The attorney should consider referring the defendant to St. Augustine, who was the first
Christian authority to advance the idea that suicide was a crime against God, nature, and rma The
Church adopted the idea, and it continues to be ecclesiastical law. Similarly, St. Thomas Aquinas
taught that one "who deliberately takes away the life that the Creator has given him displays the
utmost disregard for the will and authority of the Master."
163. See bi Part MB.
164. S"qnz note 41.
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counsel not to present mitigating evidence, he effectively binds the attorney's
hands to argue substantive issues before the court. Should the defendant change
his mind post-sentencing, the wayDavid Leston Overton did, there is not much
hope on these issues because they have been procedurally defaulted. Note,
however, that the attorney's hands are not tied regarding promxral issues. The
attorney should therefore file as many motions and objections as the defendant
will allow. The attorneyshould file these motions pretrial as well as pre-sentence;
even though the defendant will plead guilty, this does not preclude counsel from
filing sentence-related motions before the defendant enters his plea. The attor-
neyshould scrutinize the indictment and tryto find flaws; he should file a motion
declaring the capital murder and death penalty statutes unconstitutional; he
should file a motion in limine asking for judicial notice that the defendant has
requested not to present mitigating evidence and for permission to proffer
mitigating evidence nonetheless. The attorney should file a motion in limine to
limit certain kinds of victim impact evidence at the sentencing phase; this will beespecially helpful if the defendant refuses to present mitigation, becaue i will
prevent the Commonwealth from marching one victim after another up to the
stand to testify at sentencing, with relatively no response from the defendant.
The purpose of making the aforementioned motions is for the dual purpose of
success at trial (or sentencing) and preserving a record for appeal if need be. It
is impossible to know when a defendant will change his mind regarding defense
strategy, and the attorney's failure to preserve as many issues for appeal as are
possible could result in the defendant's execution despite his present desire to
live.
. It is worthwhile to attempt a forward-looking argument, stating that,
because the defendant mayonlyattempt to waive statutorilymandated appeal but
will not successfully do so, the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process 16 requires that counsel preserve as many issues as possible for that
appeal of right."6 Especially considering the defendant intends to plead guilty
and request a death sentence, the attorney can argue an automatic appeal will be
imminent, and the interests of justice require preservation of issues for the
appeal.
If the attorney discovers an appealable issue of the magnitude to reverse a
death sentence, but the defendant continues to instnct the attorney not to
pursue an appeal, what is the obligation of the lawyer?16  This question is
165. The defendant also receives this due process right through Article 1, Section 11, of the
Virginia Constitution. VA. COlx. at. 1, S 11.
166. For a discussion of the difference between waiver of general review of a death sentence
and waiver of statutory review of a death sentence, siug~muy State v. Dodd, 838 P.2d 86 (Wash.
1992).
167. Consider Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) (Burger, J. concurring), discussed sukp,
where, following evaluations by five psychiatrists with three reporting, Gilmore instructed his
attorneys not to appeal despite their opinion that there was substantial legal merit to an appeal. Id
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unanswered in Virginia law and likelywill continue to be unanswered as long as
the attorney does not act contrary to his client's wishes. Arguably the attorney
must abide by the client's decision. In this situation, though, it is important to
examine what the appealable issue precisely is; if it is, for instance, the depriva-
tion of a constitutionallyguaranteed right, the attorneymight consider pursuing
an appeal contrary to his client's wishes, justifying it only by the necessity of
protecting such an essential right. The death penaltyhas beendescribed bythe
Supreme Court of Vkirnia as the "ultimate penalty,"'1a and the attorney should
push the Rules to their limits when faced with a defendant who refuses to appeal.
This is even more important now, because the Rules are still relatively new and
therefore leave plenty of room for judicial interpretation.
VII. CGzicn
The attorney whose client pleads guilty and asks the court for death faces
a tough legal, ethical, and professional dilemma. He is bound to act as a zealous
advocate for his client, but at the same time must yield to the client's ultimate
wishes. The Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct offer little to no guidance
as to which alternative to choose. Ethical Opinion 1737 instructs the attorney
to abide by the client's wishes if asked not to present mitigation and absolutely
prohibits presentation of mitiating evidence if the competent defendant in-
structs counsel not to do so. 6' Taking into consideration the trend in other
states, it is not unlikelythat Virginia will move toward issuing an ethical opinion
stating that it is the attorney's professional obligation to allow the client to plead
guilty and ask the court to execute him. This problem will only be resolved in
Virginia, however, when a lawyer is faced with a client who wants to die and the
attorney refuses to allow the defendant to request execution. In the meantime,
an attorney representing a defendant who intends to plead guilty and ask for
death should operate on the assumption that the defendant will change his mind
and should, therefore, take measures both to represent effectively the client's
interests and to protect himself from an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
at 1015 n.5.
168. Barnes v. Commonwealth, 360 S.E2d 1%, 202 (Va. 1987).
169. SwVa. Legal Ethics Opinion No. 1737 (1999).
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